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Once the Mediterranean Sea was the "lake" of the British Empire. Their ships were 
patrolling the most important sea straits, meanwhile the British Colonies were controlling 
the most important trading routes of the sea. The British Empire was the most significant 
great power in the region for centuries, however, British influence suffered important losses 
in the World War I. Nevertheless, London was able to keep her positions until the Second 
World War, but after that London lost - as a result of financial crisis - her strength to keep 
the Empire in one block. The decreasing British influence on Cyprus was already 
noticeable after the World War II, however, it only became unquestionable in the mid-
1950s. 
The decreasing British influence on Cyprus in the period of 1955-1974 could be 
divided into three main stages: (2.) the period of 1955-1960, when London still attempted 
to keep her colonial leadership over Cyprus but already realized the possibilities and acted 
to solve the problem; (3.) the period of 1960-1964 when Great Britain was still a 
significant regional power in Cyprus but by the end of the era London had to realize her 
loss of power; (4.) and the period of 1964-1974, when the British were intentionally 
reducing their influence on Cyprus to keep their positions and obtain a neutral standing on 
the Cyprus Question. 
1. Introduction 
The first sign of decreasing British influence in Greek issues was the change of British 
role during the Greek Civil War. However, London was one of the main reasons why the 
first stage of the Civil War broke out in December 1944 and continued in 1946, but in 1947 
the British government had to realize that financially she was not able to support the Greek 
Royal government anymore against the rebellious Greek communists of KKE. 
Nevertheless, Washington replaced London, and - after the promulgation of Truman 
doctrine in 1974 - decided to keep the positions of western allies in Greece, meanwhile 
started to sponsor the Greek Royal Government with political, economic, financial, and 
armed subsidy.1 After all, British geopolitical influence suffered significant losses in 
Greece, which was obvious for the nationalist and Enosis supporter Greek and Greek 
Cypriot politicians and army officers. Separate Greek groups were certain that time had 
1 KOLIOPULOS; VEREMIS (2010): 121-122. 
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finally come for the annexation of Cyprus by Greece, however, the first impulse - which 
started the struggle for Cyprus - came from abroad.2 
After the promulgation of the Truman doctrine, the US government was concerned that 
the expansion of the Soviet Union will not stop in Eastern Europe, and they were sure that 
Greek Civil War was part of this process. In the late-1940s - learning from the Greek 
lessons - the government of the USA started to form and financially support several 
underground paramilitary groups all over Western and Southern Europe, to avert a political 
advance of Western European Communist Parties. The secret Washington based 
organization's name was "Stay Behind", which led several underground squads all over 
Europe with a close operational cooperation of the CIA. Each paramilitary squad had a 
different name, in Greece they chose to call themselves "Provia" which means sheepskin 
The Provia was well connected to Greek Cypriot nationalists, who had already chosen the 
leader of their struggle. It was the Cyprus born Colonel Georgios Grivas, who was well-
trained during the Greek Civil War and learned the guerrilla warfare very well from the 
Communist counterpart. In 1954, when he left Greece for Cyprus and formed the EOKA 
he was still connected to Provia and to different Greek political parties. It is obvious that 
the CIA knew that the Greek officials were sponsoring the EOKA struggle against the US 
main alliance since the AMAG,3 the JUSMAPG,4 and the Provia was filled with numerous 
CIA agents and the Greek government - who supported the EOKA - was controlled by 
American advisers. 
However, the CIA did not sponsor directly the foundation and struggle of EOKA but 
indirectly did. The policy was based on the US fears that the decreasing British influence in 
the region will be replaced by the Soviet Union. The popularity of AKEL just enhanced the 
concerns of the USA. On the other hand, the British colonial leadership was also 
uncomfortable with AKEL's power and started to rebuild the structure and popularity of the 
Orthodox Church. The attempt ended with full success, moreover, the religious 
intelligentsia became the other significant supporter of Enosis with the leadership of 
Archbishop III. Makarios.6 The Archbishop saw the UN General Assembly as an option to 
settle the raising case of Cyprus. The first success of his policy was when the Greek Prime 
Minister announced the Greek claims on Cyprus in 1951, and resorted to UN General 
Assembly to discuss the question of Cypriot self-determination. Nevertheless, the UN did 
not negotiate the case, but the attempt changed London's view, who took Turkey into the 
Cyprus Question and raised the potential ethnic conflict in the island. 
Greece attempted to adopt the case of Cyprus at UN General Assembly several times 
since 1954, however she was not successful. In the meantime the sowing seeds of ethnic 
conflict produced their first results: Grivas and the EOKA started their struggle in Cyprus 
against the British and Turkish Cypriots, and the Turks of Turkey committed serious 
attacks on the Greek minority of Istanbul. 
2 TOFALLIS (2002): 122-126. 
3 American Mission for Aid to Greece. 
Joint U.S. Military Advisoiy and Planning Group, Greece 
5 DROUSIOTIS (2006): 2-4., 6-8. 
6 ANDERSON (1992): 192. 
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2. The period of 1955-1960 
As we mentioned above, this was the period when London still attempted to keep her 
colonial leadership over Cyprus, but already realized the possibilities and acted to solve the 
problem. It is obvious that the British policy toward Cyprus was not organic in this period, 
moreover a parallelism is noticeable. If we divide our period further, then (2.1.) between 
1955-1957 three main versions of opinion determined her Majesties foreign policy towards 
Cyprus: 
2.1.1. The policy of unchangingness, which was favored especially by Sir John 
Harding, Governor of Cyprus, who was appointed in 1955. As a former soldier, Harding 
preferred orderliness in Cyprus. During the riots in Istanbul he immediately declared state 
emergency, while 37,000 British soldiers were controlling and inspecting the cities and the 
countryside, which ended with numerous arrests. The strict policy continued when the 
EOKA - as an answer for Harding's policy - intensified its actions in 1956. The result was 
serious: frequent guerrilla attacks in the cities and the countryside, numerous battles in 
Troodos, and executions of EOKA members by British authorities. 
Moreover, Harding saw the resistance as an organic unity and he decided to expel 
Makarios, who was the only person who would be able to mediate between Grivas and 
Harding.7 After all Makarios' exile to Islands of Seychelles and the strict policy against 
EOKA was not just Harding's decision, on the contrary, he got straight orders from London 
to keep the situation of Cyprus under control during the Crisis of Suez.8 
2.1.2. The policy of negotiation, which derived from the fact that London obviously 
lost her regional power and she had less and less financial resources to handle her military 
actions in Cyprus and to hold back the growing Greek and Turkish demands. On the other 
hand, London was also indirectly forced by Washington, mostly because the US 
governments favored the process of decolonization. The conference of London in 1955 was 
a clear attempt to satisfy every claim of the participants since Great Britain offered the 
possibility of double Enosis to Greece and Turkey, while she would have kept military 
bases on the island. Athens immediately protested against the plan, claimed to annex 
Cyprus only by herself, but accepted the terms of British military bases and offered the 
same possibility for NATO. Although the conference failed to bring any resolution since 
Turkey threatened with preventive airstrikes if the consultations accepted the Greek 
demands of enosis, but definitely changed the British authority's view who started to accept 
the fact that the Cyprus Issue should be solved by political solution and not by armed 
force.9 
2.1.3. The policy of self-government, appeared after the Conference of London when 
Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies appointed Lord Radcliffe 
constitutional expert to find an operable solution for self-determination of Cypriots but 
under British rule. The Radcliffe's proposals offered to form a Legislative Assembly with 
six seats reserved for members elected by the Turkish Cypriot community, twenty-four for 
members elected by Greek Cypriots, and six for members appointed by the Governor. 
7PANTELI (1990): 170-173. 
8 HOLLAND (2002): 146. 
9 TOFALLIS (2002): 138-140. 
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However, their decisions could have been lawful just after the approval and signature of 
Governor. The self-governing power would have been held by a Cabinet, led by a Chief 
Minister, appointed by the Governor as well. In this Cabinet a Turkish Cypriot minister 
would have maintained the Turkish Cypriot affairs, while the whole self-government would 
have had executive, initiative, and proposal power. Taken as a whole, the Radcliffe 
Constitution could have given the widest possibility of autonomy, but with the reservation 
to the Governor of decision on defence, external affairs, and public security. However, the 
proposals were accepted by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, but were rejected by Greek 
Cypriots and Greece.10 
The system of parallel policies began to disappear after the retirement of Governor 
Harding and the (2.2.) governance period of Sir Hugh Foot between 1957-1967 brought a 
more liberal and negotiable viewpoint. Even though Foot was a good diplomat, even he was 
not able to bring the EOKA and the TMT to the negotiation table, moreover the 
military situation became worse and worse on the island. 
2.2.1. The Foot - Macmillan Plan was the first attempt of Foot to adopt a resolution on 
the Cyprus Question in 1958 after when the new Macmillan cabinet decided to release 
Makarios. Although the plan still dealt with the separation, and not the independence of 
Cyprus, but legal rights of Cypriots would have been more comprehensive than before. The 
plan offered a common administrative system under British, Greek, Turkish and Cypriot 
rule, where the island would have been led by a Council which would have consisted of the 
British Governor, the Greek and Turkish representatives, and six elected Cypriot ministers, 
four from the Greek Assembly, two from the Turkish Assembly. The international status of 
the island would have remained the same as it was before for the following seven years, 
while the British Governor would have been responsible for external, defence and security 
affairs in consultation with the Greek and Turkish representatives. The legislative power 
would have been given to the House of Representatives, which had two chambers. The 
elected Cypriot representatives would have got seats in the lower house with respect of 
their community rate. The upper house would have been reserved for the representatives of 
Britain, Greece and Turkey, while a tripartite Council would have controlled the cases of 
discrimination. After all, the plan was rejected by both sides, however, it signified an 
important stage in the process of independence.11 
2.2.2. The policy of independence became more and more popular after the failure of 
the Foot - Macmillan Plan. However, Makarios still favored the Enosis but he realized - as 
he did in 1974 as well - that the achievement of self-determination by independence would 
bring less risk than an annexation by Greece. On the other hand, Turkey was also ready to 
drop her claims for partition and accept independence as a solution, since they realized that 
the Turkish minority was suffering significant losses under Greek Cypriot attacks. Zorlu, 
the Turkish Foreign Minister communicated their view several times to Averoff Greek 
Foreign Minister and to Llyod British Foreign Secretary in 1958, however, the Turks did 
not accept minority position for the Turkish Cypriots and claimed to have an equal share in 
the administration and the army. After a long period of negotiations between Averoff, 
Zorlu, Lloyd, Makarios and Kiitchiik they finally agreed to hold a conference in 1959. The 
10 TOFALLIS (2002): 146-147. 
11 HOLLAND (2002): 237-238. 
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conferences of Zurich and London officially agreed on independence and formed the basic 
structure of a new Cypriot State. The Republic of Cyprus became an independent country 
on 16 August, 1960 under the presidency of Makarios and vice-presidency of Kutchiik.12 
However Grivas blamed Makarios for betraying the dream of Enosis but he left Cyprus for 
Greece where he was received as a hero, honored with many titles and promoted to 
General. 
3. The period of 1960-1964 
As we mentioned it before, at the beginning of this period Great Britain was still a 
significant regional power but by the end of the era London had to realize her loss of 
power. However, the colonial government was replaced by the new Makarios cabinet 
abruptly, but the British influence did not disappear overnight. First of all, Great Britain 
kept Sovereign Military Bases at Akrotiri and Dhekelia, where approximately 5000-7000 
British were stationed accompanied by numerous fighter jets, helicopters and naval 
vessels.13 Since the Republic of Cyprus was part of the British Commonwealth and the 
Cypriot state administration was very similar to the British, the new Government of Cyprus 
and the British Cabinet remained in a close cooperation. Moreover, after the decolonization, 
quite a few British inhabitants or business companies stayed at the island, they all became 
part of the British influence in the new born country. 
Even though, British potential was still important on the island, the difference between 
the former colonial power and the weak regional influence was very significant. Before 
Cypriot independence Great Britain had owned the whole island, however, only 3% of 
Cyprus remained under British sovereignty after 1960, and not some 30,000 British soldiers 
were stationed there, just maximum 7000. This size of power was not enough to play a 
leading role in region of the Eastern Mediterranean, but it was still enough to keep the 
British influence in Cyprus. The importance of this influence became obvious when the 
temporarily settled ethnic conflict revived in 1963-1964. When Makarios' proposals to 
change the unsuitable constitution failed to be accepted by both sides, intercommunal fights 
began again and brought Cyprus close to a Civil War situation. The British prestige and 
their Cyprus-based forces - for the last time - played a very important and active role in 
this situation since Makarios asked London to divide the militant groups by the only 
significant army of the island: the British Forces of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. Mayor General 
Peter Young immediately acted to solve the crisis and commanded 7,000 British soldiers to 
Nicosia and drew up the Green Line, which started to divide not just the fighting sides, but 
the communities of the island as well.14 
Although the strength of British peacemaking forces was not significant they acted fast 
and seemed to solve the crisis. Even though the action was internationally recognized - as 
the situation in Cyprus was serious and only the British could act immediately - , but after 
the first attempts of the peacemaking process the UN tried to internationalize the peace 
12 TOFALLIS (2002): 159-162. 
13 KAZAMIAS (2010): 24. 
14 BRISCOE (2003): 157. 
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operation and adopt a resolution to establish a peacekeeping force under UN authorization. 
The UN banned Greece and Turkey from the participation of UNFICYP since they were 
deeply involved in the Cyprus Question. The UN Security Council also decided to hold 
back its countries from UNFICYP except for Great Britain, who was one of the guarantor 
powers of Cypriot independence. This fact was internationally recognized but the USSR 
questioned it several times during the formation process of UNFICYP why London could 
take part - moreover get a leading position - of UNFICYP, but at the same time Moscow 
was forbidden to send peacekeepers to Cyprus.15 Nevertheless Moscow had to realize that 
Cyprus was under the sphere of influence of the Western Alliance, which was a very 
important unofficial and invisible "agreement" between the USA and USSR after the 
conclusion of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and Suez Canal Crisis. Even so, it was the 
first attempt by Moscow to send Soviet peacekeepers to Cyprus, which policy has appeared 
several times during the different stages of the Cyprus Question since 1964. 
After all, on 4 March, 1964 the United Nations Security Council Resolution 18616 
adopted unanimously the creation of UNFICYP with the participation of Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Austria, Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain. Even though 
most of these countries were neutral in the Cold War, it is obvious that the participants were 
more the supporters of the Western Alliance than the Communist Bloc. Moreover, Great 
Britain played a leading role in the creation and command of UNFICYP, wherein London 
was asked to provide all vehicles, petrol, ammunition, and medical equipment. At the 
beginning of UNFICYP mandate, Great Britain had offered the most significant number of 
peacekeepers, the British Intelligence service provided the needed information for 
operations, which were led by 170 British officers, based at the Ledra Palace Headquarters 
of UNFICYP, Nicosia.17 The outcome of this great demonstration of power was that Great 
Britain spent over a million dollars just in the first month of UNFICYP mandate. The 
British Cabinet had to realize very soon that they did not have the potential anymore to 
finance bigger military operations, and hold back the growing Turkish demands. Douglas 
Home British prime minister notified the US officials already in January, 1964 that London 
was not able to maintain a balanced NATO policy at the region and mediate between 
British, Cypriot, Greek and Turkish interests, what is more, she would appreciate if 
Washington would replace her in the same way as she did in Greece in 1947.18 
On the other hand, most of the Cypriot population also did not seem to appreciate the 
British peacekeepers, they saw them as a renewal of British colonial policy. This fact 
provided numerous incidents, what is more, the Finish and Canadian soldiers rather used 
bicycles than using British ensigned vehicles.19 
15 PANTELI (1990): 204. 
16 RoC PIO (1994): 5. 
17 BRISCOE (2003): 170. 
18 NICOLET (2001): 433. 
19 BRISCOE (2003): 172. 
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4. The period of 1964-1974 
After the first two months of peacekeeping, Great Britain did not need her Intelligence 
to discover that the British peacekeepers were not welcome in Cyprus. The policy-makers 
in London seemed to realize that if they played an important role in the slippery issues of 
the Cyprus Question then they would possibly find their Sovereign Military Bases under 
attack soon. The negative aspects of peacekeeping and its huge financial expenses changed 
the policy of United Kingdom towards Cyprus, the British were deliberately reducing their 
influence on Cyprus to keep their positions and obtain a neutral standing on the Cyprus 
Question. At the beginning of this process London reduced her number of peacekeepers 
from 6,000 to 2,700, and later from 2,700 to lOOO.20 In September 1964 mostly officers 
remained at the UNFICYP, led the coordination of UNFICYP, meanwhile the peacekeepers 
did not operate within the British Sovereign Bases, and British non-UNFICYP troops did 
not operate outside them. The practical cooperation between UNFICYP and Britain - at 
least seemingly - ended, and London acted as a neutral neighbor of a troubled island. 
This policy continued during the 1960s when London decided to keep herself out of 
Cypriot internal affairs. Even though Cyprus remained a non-aligned country, practically 
Washington replaced the former British influence. This was the reason why Britain did not 
get involved in the preparation of the Acheson Plan in the summer of 1964, and then in the 
Galo Plaza Plan in 1965. What is more, President Johnson's letters were the most important 
braking factors of the crisis of 1967, and just the prestige of US foreign policy was able to 
avoid the Turkish intervention of Cyprus. After the events of 1967 London was not pleased 
to see the growing influence of the Greek Junta in Cyprus, but she was more concerned 
about Turkish demands since Ankara did not have military access to the island at that time, 
while Britain or Greece did. After all, Great Britain was following the USA leadership 
during the period, and year by year she successfully created a neutral position in Cyprus. 
The most characteristic event of British non-involvement policy was the crisis of 1974, 
when Great Britain had the ability to reduce the damage but she did use her lawful power 
and decided to remain seemingly neutral. There are numerous questions which still have to 
be asked, most importantly: Why the British - as guarantor country - did not take part in 
the intervention, even though Turkey asked them to do so, and with her participation 
London could have had the power to decrease the Turkish demands, and restore the 1960 
constitution and state structure of the Republic of Cyprus. London's official answer was 
that at the time she did not have enough military force at the Sovereign Bases to carry out 
an intervention.21 If we are observing just the facts, then we should notice that at the 
beginning of Makarios' overthrow only 5553 British soldiers were stationed in Cyprus 
accompanied by the HMS Hermes, HMS Andromeda, HMS Devonshire naval vessels and 
12 Phantom jets of Akrotiri Airbase.22 British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign 
Minister James Callaghan was right that with this military strength the British would not 
have been able to solve the crisis. But we should not forget that the question of intervention 
by only Great Britain had never been mentioned by any side, the British participation was 
20 BRISCOE (2003): 179-183. 
21 BIRAND (1985): 8., PANTELI (1984): 382. 
22 ASMUSSEN (2008): 3., 40.; KAZAMIAS (2010): 24-25. 
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asked if accompanied by the approximately 40,000 Turkish troops, which would have been 
more than enough to settle the crisis of Cyprus and restore the lawful constitution. Even so, 
the British Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister decided to keep back from the crisis 
and offered only diplomatic, mediatoring assistance. The author of this article believes that 
it is important to ask why Britain remained in the policy of non-involvement, and why she 
accepted the de facto Turkish occupation of North Cyprus? The question could be answered 
with several facts: 
4.a. Wilson and Callaghan did not wish to lose their neutral status in the island with 
supporting either side. The British did not forget the period of the 1950s when they were 
permanently under attack in Cyprus, and on the other hand the example of Ireland and 
IRA23 also warned them not to act with the favor of only one side. 
4.b. Another important reason was that London did not wish to risk her leading position 
in the UNFYCIP, from where the UN Security Council already banned Greece and Turkey. 
Great Britain would have lost her neutral status with a participation in the intervention, and 
she could have been blamed that why she was playing important role at the UNFICYP. 
4.c. If London had assumed the joint intervention with Turkey then she would have 
risked the good bilateral relationship with Greece, and would have created another hostile 
axis in the NATO, which could have affected the whole geopolitical balance of the region. 
4.d. Great Britain - as well as Turkey - surmised that the CIA was behind the 
overthrow of Makarios as the USA was behind the overthrow of Allende. At the beginning 
of the crisis Kissinger seemed to confirm this supposition as he did not accept either 
Makarios or Sampson as a legal president of Cyprus. London - after the fiasco of Suez -
did not have the power to act alone without the support or at least the permission of the US 
Government.24 
4.e. To reflect on a very interesting article,25 we can possibly suppose that Great Britain 
- with fear of losing her military bases - would have agreed to give access to Turkey to 
Cyprus, as the rest of the guarantor powers - London and Athens - did. With the 
occupation of North Cyprus Britain pushed back the issues of Sovereign Bases and 
stabilized her positions on the island. 
5. Conclusion 
It is obvious that the British regional influence was significantly decreasing during the 
period of 1955 and 1974 and followed the international trends of reducing colonial powers. 
At beginning of the 1950s Great Britain assumed that she could still keep Cyprus with a 
tripartite or with a self-governmental system, but did not have the power against the two 
new regional powers - Greece and Turkey - to achieve her aim and intention. On the other 
hand, London was struggling with the fact that she was not able to handle the military 
situation of Cyprus financially, while the two other growing powers of the region started to 
sponsor their favored ethnic group more and more. When the three regional powers with the 
23 BYRNE (2006): 149-172. 
24 ASMUSSEN (2008): 9. 
25 KAZAM1AS (2010) 
The decreasing British influence on Cyprus 1955-1974 53 
invisible permission of the Great Powers decided to give freedom for Cyprus, they created a 
state system based on a compromise, which practically was not workable. After the 
proclamation of troubled independence, Great Britain still played an important role in the 
Cypriot domestic politics, and still wished to keep Cyprus under her sphere of influence. 
Nevertheless, the crisis of 1963-1964 showed that Britain was still a significant power in 
Cyprus but she was not that anymore in the region. During the crisis London realized that 
she was not able to continue her former active foreign policy in Cyprus, and she decided to 
pass on the leading role to the USA. Between 1964-1974 the British policy makers were 
deliberately reducing their influence in Cyprus, and tried to keep their status quo and obtain 
a neutral status. Although the crisis of 1974 offered numerous opportunities to London to 
get involved and determine the future of the island, Wilson and Callaghan chose to stay 
away from the slippery issues of Cyprus and offered just their assistance as mediators. The 
voluntary but calculated policy of non-involvement continued after the crisis and definitely 
helped to keep the status of the Sovereign Military Bases and the British leading role at the 
UNFICYP. 
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